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A fter nearly three decades of effort, theUnited States can take considerablepride in answering the mandates of the
1972 Clean Water Act. At great expense, much
of the municipal and industrial pollution ema-
nating from pipes, or “point” sources, has been
reduced. But the largely voluntary effort to
reduce “nonpoint” pollution from farms and
elsewhere has been less successful. As we enter
a new millennium, progress in improving water
quality seems to have leveled off and our hopes
of meeting the goals of the Clean Water Act
seem to be receding.
Some 3,600 waterways across the nation are
listed as either impaired by nutrients or by algal
blooms, which are typically caused by excess
nutrients. The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency is locked in a contentious legal battle
with many states over additional requirements
to improve water quality. 
Part of the problem is the complex nature of
water pollution and the difficult challenge of
controlling nonpoint pollution. Clearly another
part of the problem is the question of costs.
States are heavily constrained by cost considera-
tions and reluctant to embark on another costly
round of stricter point source controls.
In Fertile Ground: Nutrient Trading’s Potential
to Cost-Effectively Improve Water Quality, the
Director of WRI’s Economics Program, Paul
Faeth, proposes a way out of this dilemma.
Using case studies in three states, he develops
a framework to assess the cost-effectiveness
of various policies and combinations of poli-
cies to reduce phosphorus loads in specific
watersheds. In all three cases, policy
approaches incorporating nutrient trading
programs are dramatically less expensive than
conventional approaches and can achieve com-
parable benefits.
With this report, WRI continues over a
decade of work on the environmental implica-
tions of agricultural policies and practices in
the United States and abroad. In Growing
Green: Enhancing the Economic and Environ-
mental Performance of U.S. Agriculture, Faeth
and the team he managed integrated volumi-
nous amounts of data into an analytic frame-
work that assessed the profitability and envi-
ronmental impacts of alternative cropping
systems. In Agricultural Policy and Sustainabil-
ity: Case Studies from India, China, the Philip-
pines, and the United States, Faeth and several
co-authors found that farm policies are usually
stacked against resource-conserving farming
methods.
WRI maintains a continuing commitment in
this area. Using the methodology developed in
this report, a study is currently underway that
F O R E W O R D
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will focus on the heavily polluted “Dead Zone”
in the Gulf of Mexico. WRI has also developed a
prototype nutrient trading web site to help sup-
port pilot nutrient trading programs across the
country.
A N T H O N Y  J A N E T O S
S E N I O R  V I C E  P R E S I D E N T  F O R  P R O G R A M
W O R L D  R E S O U R C E S  I N S T I T U T E
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T he Clean Water Act of 1972 has largelysucceeded in reducing pollution fromindustrial, municipal, and other “point”
sources. But the job of achieving clean water in
the United States is only about half done.
Roughly 40 percent of the nation’s surface
waters remain at least partially impaired, and
surveys suggest there has been little improve-
ment recently. 
Further progress now depends on developing
low-cost, innovative approaches that can effec-
tively cut pollution from “nonpoint” sources
such as agriculture and urban runoff. But work
still needs to be done to test new approaches
and to determine how they can be implemented
to offer cost-effective and quantifiable improve-
ments in water quality.
This study amounts to a search for such new,
cost-effective approaches. It is based on two
premises. First, excessive nutrient loading is the
single largest cause of water quality impairment
in the United States; and second, attacking the
worst pollution problem should yield significant
benefits. 
Using case studies of watersheds in three
states—Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota—
this study develops a framework to explore the
cost-effectiveness and environmental perfor-
mance of various strategies to reduce phospho-
rus loads in specific watersheds. It describes the
impact of point and nonpoint sources on phos-
phorus loads, the technology options for reduc-
ing those loads, and the costs of implementation
using various technologies and policies. Further,
it compares several policy approaches with an
estimate of the least-cost outcome, giving policy-
makers an opportunity to compare costs relative
to a theoretical minimum. 
In all three cases, the analysis finds that pol-
icy approaches utilizing nutrient trading are
dramatically less expensive than conventional
point-source performance requirements. In the
Michigan case, for example, one variation utiliz-
ing trading is estimated to cost about $2.90 per
pound of phosphorus removed, compared to
almost $24 per pound for conventional point-
source requirements. 
Based on the analysis, we recommend that
• The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and state environmental agencies
I N T R O D U C T I O N  /  O V E R V I E W
1
Excessive nutrient loading is the single
largest cause of water quality impairment
in the United States.
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allow trading among industrial and munici-
pal point sources whenever new nutrient
reduction requirements are put in place.
• EPA and the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture provide much greater regulatory and
financial support for state efforts to develop
point-nonpoint source pilot trading pro-
grams and standards.
• Concentrated animal feeding operations be
treated the same as industrial and munici-
pal point sources, which means that they
should face involuntary permitting
processes and tight enforcement.
• Sufficient money from farm income subsidy
programs be shifted to conservation pro-
grams so that environmental problems
caused by agriculture can be remediated
using market-based approaches.
• Monitoring of water quality be vastly
increased.
• Federal and state agencies explore opportu-
nities for trading in large watersheds.
IS TRADING THE ANSWER?
Experience to date is limited, but it appears that
trading can be part of the answer to achieve bet-
ter water quality. Trading has been successfully
used to obtain cost-effective reductions in other
areas of environmental concern, including lead,
sulfur dioxide, and other air emissions. In addi-
tion, trading is the leading option proposed to
address the build-up of greenhouse gas emis-
sions that could cause climate change.
When tighter standards are put in place, trad-
ing increases flexibility and reduces costs by
allowing dischargers with new obligations the
option of adapting their own facilities or financ-
ing comparable reductions by others. Trading
makes it profitable for sources with low treat-
ment costs to reduce their own effluents
beyond legal requirements, generate a credit,
and sell these credits to dischargers with higher
treatment costs. This flexibility produces a less
expensive outcome overall while achieving—
and even going beyond—the mandated environ-
mental target. 
This analysis examines trading as an option to
achieve phosphorus reductions in three water-
sheds in the upper Midwest: the Saginaw Bay
watershed in Michigan, the Rock River water-
shed in Wisconsin, and the Minnesota River Val-
ley. In each of these cases, variations of nutrient
trading are compared with traditional regulatory
and subsidy approaches. The results, presented
in Chapter 5, show great potential for cost sav-
ings by applying market-based strategies to
water quality regulations and agricultural con-
servation subsidy programs. In Michigan and
Wisconsin, pilot trading programs are being
pursued, and in Minnesota, ad hoc trades have
occurred. This report describes some of the
experiences to date with these efforts and others.
While trading is the economically preferred
approach for nutrient management problems,
there are a number of significant concerns that
must be addressed to ensure that trading is an
environmentally effective and equitable solu-
When tighter standards are put in place,
trading increases flexibility and reduces
costs. This flexibility produces a less
expensive outcome overall while
achieving—and even going beyond—the
mandated environmental target. 
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tion. Some of the measures that have been sug-
gested also affect the cost-effectiveness of the
outcome, and these tradeoffs are important to
recognize. A key issue in nutrient trading is
equivalence. The biggest economic and environ-
mental opportunity appears to be trading
between “point” and “nonpoint” sources. But
point discharges are relatively easy to quantify
and monitor, while nonpoint discharges are
episodic and cannot be directly measured, only
estimated. However, nonpoint source reduc-
tions can also have the additional advantage of
decreasing sediment loads. The apparent bene-
fits and risks of nutrient trading as a strategy to
cost-effectively support the goals of the Clean
Water Act point to the need for a cautious but
also encouraging approach. However, means
are available to increase the certainty of out-
comes in ways that still produce major savings.
This and other issues of program implementa-
tion are discussed in Chapter 6. 
We start by examining some of the major
trends and policy issues in Chapter 2 and then
explain how trading could address some of the
problems in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we
describe the three case study watersheds. This
section highlights the water quality problems
each watershed faces, as well as the analytical
methods we used to produce our results. 
The intent of the analysis is to develop and
implement a policy tool to explore the cost-
effectiveness and environmental performance
of various strategies to improve water quality in
specific watersheds. In doing this, we hope to
illuminate the economic issues, to facilitate the
development of successful pilot nutrient trading
programs, and to better understand the oppor-
tunities and barriers to improving water quality
under each of the policy approaches considered.
HOW DOES NUTRIENT TRADING
WORK? AN ILLUSTRATION
Assume there is a river somewhere in the United
States and the state environmental agency deter-
mines that the river is “impaired.” There is too
much phosphorus getting into the water, causing
algal blooms that die and leave too little oxygen
in the water for the fish to survive. The state
decides to impose a limit of 1 part per million
(ppm) of phosphorus in the waste stream of
municipal sewage and industrial waste treatment
plants. The state agrees to let these dischargers
have the option of trading to meet the regulatory
requirement. There are three towns along the
river and a number of factories. The area also
has many farms that contribute to the problem,
but these aren’t regulated.
The intent of the analysis is to develop and
implement a policy tool to explore the cost-
effectiveness and environmental
performance of various strategies to improve
water quality in specific watersheds. 
B O X  1 W H AT  T R A D I N G  I S
A N D I S N ’ T
• Trading is an adjunct to regulation, not a
substitute for it.
• Trading is used to improve water quality,
not degrade it.
• Trading is used between sources in the
same area of impact, not outside it.
• Trading is used to reduce net loads, not
increase them.
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The first town’s sewage treatment plant is old
and due for an upgrade, so that town decides to
rebuild its plant and add the necessary technol-
ogy to meet the standard. When bundled into
the upgrade, the addition of phosphorus control
is cheap, so the town’s costs to meet the regula-
tion are low. 
The second town rebuilt its plant five years
ago, when the state didn’t require phosphorus
treatment. Upgrading a relatively new plant
would be expensive now, and the town wants to
spend its money on a new school, not more
sewage treatment. However, there is a factory
nearby that also has to meet the new standard.
The factory offers to reduce its phosphorus
treatment to 0.5 ppm, low enough to provide
the necessary credits to meet the town’s
requirement, if the town will split the cost of
the factory’s more expensive upgrade. Splitting
the factory’s cost is much lower than the cost of
upgrading the town’s facility, so the town agrees
to the trade. The town and the factory both save
money and when considered together, the new
requirement is met for both. Since both the fac-
tory and wastewater treatment plant discharge
to the river from a specific point, i.e., a pipe,
this is a “point-point” trade. 
The third town also upgraded its plant
recently. A member of the town council gets a
group of farmers to agree to put assorted con-
servation practices in place if the town will pay
the expenses. These conservation practices not
only reduce the amount of phosphorus getting
into the river, but also sediment and pesticides.
The state gives its approval, but the agricultural
loads are variable since they only occur when it
rains, so the state makes the town buy three
times as much as the load reduction require-
ment for the plant. This “trading ratio” will
provide a margin of safety for the river. Since
the load of the plant is 10,000 pounds of phos-
phorus a year, the town must buy 30,000
pounds of reductions from the farmers or
other sources that don’t come from a specific
point like a pipe. The cost of these “nonpoint”
trades is much less than upgrading the plant,
even with the extra 20,000 pounds. Rather
than get all of its credits from farmers, the
town council also decides to give some money
to a local conservation group to restore a
nearby wetland. The conservation group buys
up several farms on low-lying areas of the river
and plants the land with water-loving plants
that grow in the region and provide habitat for
waterfowl and other species. As the wetland
matures, the plants trap phosphorus-carrying
sediments from the water, reducing the load
and improving the quality of the river for peo-
ple and wildlife. The town takes credit for the
reductions provided by the wetlands and
applies one third of them against the load
reduction mandated by the state.
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T he principal source of information aboutthe nation’s water quality is the Environ-mental Protection Agency’s National
Water Quality Inventory. This is a compilation of
information submitted by states, Indian tribes,
territories, interstate water commissions, and
the District of Columbia.
For the 1996 report, states and other jurisdic-
tions surveyed 19 percent of the nation’s river
miles; 40 percent of lakes, ponds, and reser-
voirs; 72 percent of estuaries; 6 percent of
ocean shoreline waters; and 94 percent of the
Great Lakes shoreline. The survey found that:
• For rivers, 56 percent were rated good (fully
supporting all uses), 8 percent were rated
good but threatened for one or more uses,
36 percent were rated impaired for one or
more uses, and in less than 1 percent uses
were not attainable.
• For lakes, ponds, and reservoirs, 51 percent
were rated good, 10 percent were good
but threatened, 36 percent were impaired,
and in less than 1 percent uses were not
attainable.
• For estuaries, 58 percent were rated good,
4 percent were good but threatened, 38 per-
cent were impaired, and in less than 1 per-
cent uses were not attainable.
• For ocean shoreline waters, 79 percent were
rated good, 9 percent good but threatened,
and 13 percent were impaired.
• For the Great Lakes, 2 percent were rated
good, 1 percent good but threatened, 97 per-
cent impaired, and in less than 1 percent
uses were not attainable.
These results are generally similar to the 1994
inventory. In that survey, surface waters only
partially supporting or not supporting their des-
ignated uses included 36 percent of surveyed
rivers and streams, 37 percent of lakes, ponds,
and reservoirs, and 36 percent of estuaries.
Figure 1 shows the results from the EPA’s
surface water quality assessments undertaken
between 1988 and 1996. For rivers, lakes and
estuaries, the proportion of the waters surveyed
that fully support their designated uses has
declined, while those waters not supporting or
partially supporting has increased. Although
there are notable problems with this dataset,1
the trend shown here nevertheless suggests that
the United States is failing to restore the quality
of the nation’s water. 
CAUSES OF IMPAIRMENT
The principal cause of surface water impairment
is agriculture, which contributes to problems in
W A T E R  Q U A L I T Y  T R E N D S
A N D  I S S U E S
2
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70 percent of the impaired rivers, 49 percent of
the impaired lakes, and 27 percent of the
impaired estuaries. (See Table 1.) Industrial
and municipal discharges are also significant
causes of water quality problems; in the nation’s
estuaries, they are the leading contributors to
impairment. The major pollutants from these
agricultural sources are nutrients, silt and oxy-
gen-depleting substances (primarily organic
wastes), metals, and bacteria. Metals have been
identified as one of the leading sources of lake
impairment, because of the widespread detection
of mercury in the tissues of fish (USEPA, 1998). 
Excessive inputs of nutrients impair water
through a process called eutrophication, which
causes a wide variety of problems (Smith,
1998). These include
• Increased biomass of phytoplankton;
• Shifts in phytoplankton to bloom-forming
species that may be toxic or inedible;
• Decreases in water transparency;
• Taste, odor, and water treatment problems;
• Oxygen depletion;
• Increased incidence of fish kills;
• Loss of desirable fish species;
• Reductions in harvestable fish and shellfish;
and
• Decreases in aesthetic value of the water body.
Nonpoint sources, particularly croplands, are
by far the largest source of nutrients in Ameri-
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can waterways. (See Table 2.) One study found
that nonpoint sources account for 82 percent of
total nitrogen discharges and 84 percent of total
phosphorus discharges. Croplands alone
account for 39 percent of all nitrogen loads and
30 percent of all phosphorus loads. In contrast,
point sources account for 18 to 19 percent of
nitrogen and phosphorus discharges (Carpenter
et al., 1998).
Farmers have dramatically increased nitrogen
fertilizer use since the mid-1960s. (See Figure 2.)
Nitrogen use has increased by about 150 per-
cent, from 4.6 million tons in 1965 to about 12
million tons in the mid-1990s. Phosphorus
applications in the form of P2O5 were about 25
percent higher in 1995 than in 1965; use peaked
in 1979 at 5.6 million tons (USDA, 1997a). 
Plants do not use a large percentage of the
nutrients applied. A National Research Council
analysis of nutrient use in the United States
found that up to 40 percent of nitrogen and
about 60 percent of phosphorus is not taken up
by crops (National Research Council, 1993). In
the case of nitrogen, which is soluble, most of
the residual is readily available and contaminates
T A B L E  1 . L E A D I N G  S O U R C E S  A N D  P O L L U T A N T S  O F  I M P A I R E D
W A T E R W A Y S  A F F E C T I N G  T W O  O R  M O R E  C A T E G O R I E S
O F  S U R F A C E  W A T E R S
Percentage
Rivers Lakes Estuaries
Sources of Impairment
Agriculture 70 49 27
Industrial point sources/discharges 14 – 56
Municipal point sources 9 18 44
Urban runoff/Storm sewers 13 21 20
Land disposal of wastes – 11 19
Hydromodification 14 14 –
Pollutants/Stressors
Nutrients 40 51 57
Siltation 51 25 –
Oxygen-depleting substances 29 21 33
Bacteria 32 – 42
Metals 16 51 –
Habitat alterations 19 – 14
Source: USEPA, 1998. National Water Quality Inventory.
Nonpoint sources, particularly croplands,
are by far the largest source of nutrients in
American waterways.
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T A B L E  2 . N I T R O G E N  A N D  P H O S P H O R U S  D I S C H A R G E S  T O  S U R F A C E
W A T E R S  F R O M  P O I N T  A N D  N O N P O I N T  S O U R C E S  I N  T H E
U N I T E D  S T A T E S  ( I N  T H O U S A N D S  O F  M E T R I C  T O N S  P E R  Y E A R )
Source Nitrogen Phosphorus
Nonpoint sources
Croplands 3,204 615
Pastures 292 95
Rangelands 778 242
Forests 1,035 495
Other rural lands 659 170
Other nonpoint sources 695 68
Total nonpoint discharges 6,663 1,658
Total point sources 1,495 330
Total discharge (point + nonpoint) 8,158 2,015
Nonpoint as a percentage of total 82 84
Source: Carpenter et al., 1998.
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the environment through runoff, leaching, and
volatilization to the atmosphere. Phosphorus
binds to the soil and reaches surface waters
through soil erosion processes. So much phos-
phorus has been used in the past that in many
areas extension agents recommend that farmers
stop applying it. 
Animal manure is another key source of
nutrient use on croplands and pastures. In the
last 30 years, and particularly in the last 10, live-
stock populations have shifted away from cattle
and toward poultry, resulting in greater nutrient
concentration in wastes. Poultry litter has a
much higher concentration of nutrients per
unit than cattle manure, roughly 150 percent
more nitrogen and 200 percent more phospho-
rus. The total population of dairy cows and
other cattle is down by 12 percent since 1972,
while the population of poultry layers and broil-
ers is up by 134 percent. The number of turkeys
has increased by 180 percent.2 The volume of
animal wastes has not changed between 1972
and 1996, but the nutrient levels in waste have
gone up significantly. Using livestock numbers
and standard waste and nutrient coefficients,
we estimate that the total amount of nitrogen in
domestic livestock wastes is up by 17 percent
and phosphorus by 18 percent. 3
The total availability of nitrogen and phospho-
rus from fertilizer and animal wastes in 1995
was 21.4 million tons and 7.4 million tons,
respectively. This represents no change in the
case of phosphorus, but a 30-percent increase
in the availability of nitrogen for cropland appli-
cations from these sources since 1972. 
A contributing factor in water pollution from
animal wastes is that manure is typically
applied well beyond crop needs. About 90 per-
cent of the manure from animal operations
does not leave the farm where it is produced
(Bosch and Napit, 1992); because of high trans-
portation costs, it is usually applied only to the
land on the farm. It typically takes an area of
cropland about 1,000 times greater than the
feedlot to distribute manure at rates comparable
to crop requirements (NRC 1993). If manure is
applied excessively, phosphorus builds up in the
soil, and without proper erosion control will
run off into surface waters. Excess nitrogen not
only runs off into waterways, but can also leach
and contaminate groundwater or escape to the
atmosphere as nitrous oxide (N2O), a gas that
contributes to global warming.
Another trend contributing to excessive nutrient
flow into the environment is lagging sewage treat-
ment. Because of population growth, there are
now more people who are not served by some
form of sewage treatment than in 1980. The per-
centage of people served from 1980 to 1996
increased from 70 to 72 percent (USEPA, 1996
and 1980 Needs Surveys). However, population
increased over that same time by 38 million peo-
ple, or 17 percent (U.S. Department of Commerce,
1998). According to our calculations, about 75 mil-
lion people—up by 5 million since 1980—do not
currently have access to sewage treatment. 
WATER QUALITY POLICY ISSUES
The Clean Water Act (CWA) set a national goal
of achieving zero discharge by 1985. But most
of the evidence suggests that we are moving
further from this goal, rather than closer
towards it. 
The Clean Water Act set a national goal of
achieving zero discharge by 1985. But most
of the evidence suggests that we are moving
further from this goal, rather than closer
towards it. 
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Why are we failing to achieve the goals of the
Act? One reason is that the problem has grown.
With more people, a bigger economy, and more
demand on natural resources as receptors of
pollution and providers of water, recreation and
other services, the challenge has grown larger. 
A second major reason concerns policy for-
mulation. In the water quality area, policy is
fractured, expensive, and inconsistent. Both the
Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of Agriculture (USDA) address
water quality problems at the federal level. As a
broad generalization, given the relative levels of
effort, the focus of these two arms of the gov-
ernment can be characterized as regulation to
achieve point source control and subsidies for
voluntary nonpoint source abatement, though
both use regulation, grants, and subsidies to
some extent. 
When the Clean Water Act was first passed,
several dramatic events—such as the burning of
the Cuyahoga River in Ohio—prompted a
national focus on controlling industrial and
municipal sources. Under the National Pollu-
tion Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),
state environmental agencies with USEPA over-
sight grant permits to point source dischargers
such as municipal and industrial wastewater
treatment plants. These permits control the dis-
charge of pollutants into the nation’s waters.
The permits specify control levels that must be
achieved. The agencies also monitor sources for
compliance and can take a variety of actions to
force compliance when permitted discharge lev-
els are violated.
A great deal of money has been spent in the
United States on municipal and industrial
waste treatment and agricultural conservation
practices. For example, in the original 1972 Act
the federal government agreed to pay up to 75
percent (later reduced to 55 percent) of the con-
struction and design cost for municipal treat-
ment plants. Between 1974 and 1994, about
$96 billion was spent through the federal con-
struction grants program for new municipal
construction and upgrades for point source con-
trol. Local governments have added another
$117 billion (AMSA/WEF, 1999). 
Over the next 20 years, EPA estimates that
almost $140 billion in capital costs will be
needed for municipal treatment works and
related needs. The Association of Metropolitan
Sewerage Agencies (AMSA) and the Water
Environment Federation say that another $190
billion will be needed by local governments to
replace aging facilities and collection systems,
not including operation and maintenance costs
(AMSA/WEF, 1999).
The approach taken for nonpoint sources
stands in stark contrast to that for point
sources. Abatement programs for nonpoint
source pollution occur mainly through subsidy
programs provided by the USDA and EPA. The
lion’s share of the funds come through agricul-
tural legislation to farmers for land retirement
and cost-share programs, primarily for erosion
control. In recent years, the USDA has spent
around $3.5 billion per year on conservation
programs, extension, administration, and
research. EPA spends about another $800 mil-
lion on its voluntary nonpoint programs
Over the next 20 years, EPA estimates that
almost $140 billion in capital costs will be
needed for municipal treatment works and
related needs . . . another $190 billion will
be needed by local governments to replace
aging facilities and collection systems.
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(USDA, 1997a). Approximately half of the
USDA’s money goes to the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP), which was conceived
primarily as a means to keep land out of pro-
duction to support crop prices. Environmental
benefits of the CRP were initially focused on
reducing soil erosion; in this respect, the pro-
gram has been effective. Since 1982, soil ero-
sion in the United States has been cut by 40
percent (USDA, 1994a). Adjustments in the
program have attempted to make it more
responsive to water quality needs, but about 60
percent of the acreage in the program is con-
centrated in the Northern Plains, Southern
Plains, and Mountain States, where water qual-
ity benefits from the program are relatively
small (USDA, 1997a).
There is some measure of involuntary regula-
tion of nonpoint sources provided in the CWA,
particularly for farms larger than 1,000 animal
units.4 However, even for such large operating
units, regulation is not automatic in most
states. The state first has to make a determina-
tion that the source is discharging to a water
body and contributing to a water quality prob-
lem; only then will the farm be required to
apply for a permit. Of 1.1 million farms in the
United States, just 10,000, or 1 percent, have
permits under the CWA (Adler, et al., 1993). 
As a result, wastes from animal operations
are not controlled with anywhere near the same
rigor as human wastes, even though, in the
United States, waste from livestock is about 130
times greater than that from humans. Taken
together, the 1,600 dairies of California’s Cen-
tral Valley produce waste equivalent to 21 mil-
lion people. The 600 million chickens of the
Delmarva Peninsula on the eastern side of the
Chesapeake Bay generate as much nitrogen as a
city of 500,000 (U.S. Senate, 1997).
Yet, there is a wide variance across the states
regarding nonpoint source regulations and
Wastes from animal operations are not
controlled with anywhere near the same
rigor as human wastes, even though, in the
United States, waste from livestock is about
130 times greater than that from humans.
B O X  2 T H E  C L E A N  W AT E R  A C T
Federal water pollution control law
attempts to protect water quality by con-
trolling the discharge of pollutants. Con-
gress passed the Clean Water Act (CWA)
in 1972 with the basic objective “to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”
The CWA sought to have “fishable and
swimmable waters” by 1983, “zero dis-
charge” of pollutants by 1985, and to elim-
inate the release of “toxics in toxic
amounts.” The law made the EPA respon-
sible for setting national standards for the
discharge of effluents on an industry-by-
industry basis, considering both the capa-
bilities of pollution control technologies
and the costs of implementation. This leg-
islation makes it illegal to discharge pollu-
tants to surface waters without a permit.
The legislation specifically focused on
point sources. The law was extensively
amended in 1977 and 1987 to expand
EPA’s powers and to address nonpoint
pollution through voluntary programs.
Adapted from: Adler et al., 1993, and Arbuckle
et al., 1993.
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their implementation (Environmental Law
Institute, 1997). As of 1996, only 16 states
required nutrient management plans, and these
were usually in areas suffering from ground-
water contamination. Eighteen states required
practices for controlling soil erosion, but only
when a complaint is filed by a citizen or govern-
ment agency. Implementation in response to
the complaint is only required if cost-share
funds are available from the government
(USDA, 1997a).
It is clear that the nation’s existing water qual-
ity policy framework is inadequate. Not only is
the nation failing to meet the goals set out by
Congress, but forward progress seems to be
slow and difficult. In many cases, environmen-
tal groups have resorted to litigation in an
attempt to make state and federal agencies
enforce the basic requirements of the CWA.
States are charged with identifying waters
within their jurisdiction that do not meet desig-
nated uses and developing Total Maximum
Daily Loads (TMDLs) to address the problems.
TMDLs are plans to establish and allocate load-
ing targets. This typically means additional
requirements for point sources and more subsi-
dies for nonpoint sources. Where states do not
accomplish these tasks, EPA must do it for
them. There are currently 12 states where EPA
is under court order to establish TMDLs if the
states do not, another 15 states with pending lit-
igation, and 4 states where notices of intent to
sue have been filed (USEPA, 1999). 
The list of impaired waterways is extensive.
Section 303(d) of the CWA requires states to
identify waters that are not fishable or swim-
mable and to develop TMDLs for these waters.
Nationwide, there are 3,456 waterways listed as
impaired by nutrients and another 141 impaired
by algal blooms, typically caused by excess
nutrients. (See Table 3.) 
T A B L E  3 . T H E  T O P  2 0  S T A T E S  B Y
N U M B E R  O F  W A T E R W A Y S
I M P A I R E D  B Y  N U T R I E N T S
Illinois 634
Florida 539
Mississippi 469
Oklahoma 218
Pennsylvania 217
Ohio 204
Montana 156
Maryland 145
Delaware 138
Massachusetts 135
North Dakota 98
Tennessee 60
California 58
Kentucky 52
Wisconsin 46
Connecticut 36
Rhode Island 35
Michigan 35
Iowa 25
Nebraska 24
Subtotal 3,324
Total 50 States 3,456
Source: USEPA, 1999.
Nationwide, there are 3,456 waterways
listed as impaired by nutrients and
another 141 impaired by algal blooms,
typically caused by excess nutrients.
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M any studies on the economics of envi-ronmental regulation emphasize theimportance of allowing flexibility in
addressing environmental problems. 
Trading, as an adjunct to regulation, can help
provide the flexibility to keep compliance costs
down while meeting or exceeding water quality
goals. For example, discharge permits, a com-
mon regulatory approach for reducing point
source pollution, specify the amount and type
of allowable discharge to the nation’s waters.
In the case of nutrients, permits are used to
limit discharges that were previously uncon-
trolled or tighten prior limits, causing permit
holders to incur significant capital and operat-
ing costs to comply. For several reasons,
including size, control technology, and charac-
teristics of the incoming waste stream, dis-
chargers can face vastly different costs of com-
pliance, but have little flexibility to seek
cost-effective solutions without programs such
as trading.
There are two fundamental types of trading
programs for any type of discharge: open and
closed. Closed trading programs are far more
common and are an extension of traditional reg-
ulation in that they begin with a mandate to
reduce discharges. Often called “cap and trade,”
these systems include a mandatory “cap” on
emissions or discharges and individual
allowances to sources within a defined trading
area. A cap is established by the regulatory
agency to achieve or maintain ambient air,
water, or other environmental quality standards.
A TMDL—Total Maximum Daily Load—is the
process under the Clean Water Act that estab-
lishes and allocates the cap within a watershed
or impaired area. Caps may be fixed or declining
depending on the attainment or nonattainment
status. A cap can be increased without under-
mining the integrity of the water quality objec-
tives if sources not controlled by the cap opt in
and reduce their loads by at least the amount
that the cap is extended. For example, if a cap
were on point sources only, nonpoint sources
could make load reductions that could be used
to increase the point source cap. Allocations in
the form of allowances are established for each
discharge site within the trading area based on a
percentage of overall reductions that must be
achieved from a baseline of actual or allowed
historical discharge levels. A trading system is
said to be “fully closed” when all discharge sites
are controlled under the cap and the cap is equal
W H A T  A B O U T  T R A D I N G?
3
Trading, as an adjunct to regulation, can
help provide the flexibility to keep
compliance costs down while meeting or
exceeding water quality goals.
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to the total permissible load for the watershed
(Stephenson and Shabman, 1996). 
Closed systems have been developed and
implemented in areas where ambient environ-
mental standards are not being met to provide a
more cost-effective means of achieving the
reductions necessary to attain these standards. 
The Acid Rain Trading Program under the
federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 is
one example of a closed trading system. The
program, which set a cap of 8.95 million tons of
SO2 per year, is enforced through a system of
tradable emission allowances. From 1995 to
1997 the program exceeded expectations, with
firms over-achieving the reduction target at less
than half the cost. Industry and EPA initially
estimated that abatement costs would be in the
range of $750-$1,000 per ton, but allowance
prices reached a low of $66 per ton in mid-
1995 and have generally remained below $200
per ton since the system’s inception. Over the
long run, it is estimated that allowance trading
could result in savings of $700 to $800 million
per year compared to a command-and-control
approach with a uniform emission standard
(Anderson, 1999).
The states of California and Illinois have also
implemented closed air emission trading pro-
grams designed to attain the national ambient
air quality standard for ozone. 
Open systems are usually voluntary. Where
ambient standards are being met, they are used
to maintain or improve environmental quality
while allowing for economic growth and devel-
opment. A number of states are looking into
the development of open air and water quality
trading programs. Michigan’s air emission trad-
ing program took effect on March 16, 1996,
and the states of Florida and Texas are also
working to implement similar programs.
Open trading systems rely on existing regula-
tions to establish a baseline; reductions from
the baseline generate a reduction credit. Credits
can be banked, traded, or used to comply with
discharge limits established by an applicable
regulation. Open systems offer greater opera-
tional flexibility and improvements in environ-
mental quality without establishing a manda-
tory cap and allowance for each discharge site.
Reductions must be real, surplus, and enforce-
able to be used or traded under an open system. 
In a few instances, regulatory agencies have
allowed trading between polluters. In these
cases, those sources with high remediation
costs have been allowed to purchase unused
emissions allowances provided under another
facility’s permit. The most important determi-
nants of success have been cost and sufficiency
of trading options, limited regulatory restriction
on trading, low transaction costs, certainty in
establishing pollution levels, and anticipated
improvement in environmental quality (Hahn
and Hester, 1988).
Regulators have allowed trading in a small
number of cases for water quality management
(Bacon, 1992; Hahn and Hester, 1988; USEPA,
1996). While effluent trading programs have
been very successful for lead, air emissions, and
sulfur dioxide trading, the results in the water
quality area are not impressive.5 In the first
instance, the state of Wisconsin gave sources
such as wastewater treatment plants, and pulp
and paper mills the right to meet state water
quality standards through the trading of effluent
rights. The state initiated biological oxygen
demand (BOD) trading on a 35-mile stretch of
the heavily industrialized Fox River and on 500
miles of the Wisconsin River. It allowed trades
between the paper mills and municipal waste-
water treatment plants. However, regulators
would only allow trades if permitted discharge
levels could not be met through the adoption of
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technological standards. Cost reduction was not
considered a legitimate reason for trading. Since
1981, only one trade has occurred. Several fac-
tors are thought to have contributed to the lim-
ited activity, including the severe restrictions
imposed by the state on the ability of sources to
trade, the vulnerability of the program to legal
challenge, and the fact that the dischargers
developed a variety of compliance alternatives
that had not been foreseen when the regulations
were drafted (Anderson, 1999).
The Environmental Protection Agency is cur-
rently considering extending point-point trading
for copper dischargers in San Francisco Bay and
for dischargers of nitrogen and suspended
solids in Tampa Bay.
POINT-NONPOINT TRADING
In the point-nonpoint trading area, programs
are currently in place at the Dillon and Cherry
Creek Reservoirs in the Denver, Colorado, area;
in North Carolina’s Tar-Pamlico Basin; and are
being considered in many other places.6
Dillon Reservoir provides about half of the
city of Denver’s water supply. Four municipal
wastewater plants discharge into the reservoir.
Studies in the 1980s indicated that phosphorus
discharges would have to be reduced to main-
tain the reservoir’s water quality and accommo-
date future growth, and that reductions would
have to include nonpoint sources such as
runoff from lawns and streets, and seepage
from septic tanks. Using 1982 phosphorus dis-
charges as the baseline, the plan established a
cap on total phosphorus loadings, set load lim-
its for the four treatment plants, and allowed
trading of phosphorus loadings with nonpoint
sources (Anderson, 1999).
In this case, nonpoint source control was
allowed as a means to supplement point source
management, provide for regional growth, and
improve water quality in the reservoir. Point
sources can increase discharges above approved
limits only if they reduce loads from nonpoint
sources in the watershed. In order to deal with
the uncertainty of nonpoint source reductions,
only half of the expected reduction from non-
point sources can be applied against point
source loads. Since 1984, point sources in the
area have increased their efficiency and reduced
their phosphorus loads significantly. Point
sources have generally been able to keep their
loads below regulatory limits, so only three
trades have taken place. Future trades are
expected as development in the area proceeds
(Bacon, 1992; Michigan DEQ, 1998a). A similar
program is in place at Cherry Creek Reservoir—
also a source of water for the Denver region—
but no trades have taken place to date because
phosphorus loadings at municipal treatment
facilities are still below the limits set by the Col-
orado Water Basin Commission. 
In 1989, the North Carolina Environmental
Management Commission designated the Tar-
Pamlico Basin as “nutrient-sensitive” after stud-
ies found that algae blooms and low dissolved
oxygen posed a threat to the basin’s fishery
resources. The formal designation required the
state Division of Environmental Management
(DEM) to identify the nutrient sources, set
nutrient limitation objections, and develop a
nutrient control plan. The DEM analysis
showed that most of the basin’s nutrient load-
ings (primarily nitrogen, but also phosphorus)
came from agricultural runoff and other non-
point sources. Other sources include municipal
wastewater treatment plants and industrial and
mining operations (Anderson, 1999; Michigan
DEQ, 1998a).
In the Tar-Pamlico, an association of point
source dischargers is allowed to trade with one
another under a cap. If the cap cannot be met,
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members of the association can pay into a fund
to support a government-managed program
that encourages the adoption of best manage-
ment practices by farmers in the watershed.
Tar-Pamlico is a hybrid of a trading program
and an effluent tax, since the credits are pur-
chased at a fixed price and there is no direct
connection between the credits needed by the
point sources and the credits generated by the
nonpoint source program. In the first phase of
the program, association members improved
the efficiency of their facilities and successfully
met defined standards. Allowable discharges
are being gradually reduced during the second
phase, which began in 1995 (USEPA, 1992;
Michigan DEQ, 1998a). 
A number of other trading programs are in
existence or being developed in Colorado, Con-
necticut, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.
However, in the existing cases, only limited
markets for nutrient trading have emerged
because the programs are not fully functional
or allowable discharge limits have not been
reached. Some programs have actually
increased administrative and transaction costs,
making trading difficult. 
THE POTENTIAL FOR 
POLLUTION TRADING
On a strictly physical basis, the opportunities
for nutrient trading appear to be enormous. A
conservative estimate suggests that point-non-
point trading could be applicable in as many as
900 watersheds in the United States (USEPA,
1992a). Nonpoint sources, in particular agricul-
ture, are major contributors to water pollution
and remain largely unregulated, creating a vast
opportunity for significant reductions in pol-
luted runoff. The U.S. National Research Coun-
cil estimated national nitrogen “residuals”—
that is, nitrogen not taken up by plant mater-
ial—on cropland at 6.6 to 9.1 million metric
tons and phosphorus residuals at 2.9 million
metric tons, much of which represents excess
use. Other researchers have shown that as
much as three quarters of excess nutrient use
can be avoided through fairly simple and inex-
pensive techniques such as soil testing and fer-
tilizer banding (NRC, 1993).
From an economic standpoint, the opportuni-
ties for cost savings from point-nonpoint source
trading are large. One estimate suggested the
cost of point-source reduction could be 65
times higher than nonpoint source reduction
(Bacon, 1992). EPA estimates that if back-
ground pollution from agriculture were
reduced, the need for tertiary (advanced) water
treatment could be avoided—providing a net
saving of $15 billion in capital costs for tertiary
treatment (USEPA, 1992).
Nutrient trading between point sources makes
sense as well. Wastewater treatment, like many
processes, is characterized by significant
economies of scale; larger facilities can process
wastewater at much lower per-unit cost than
small facilities. Particularly in cases involving a
large number of small treatment works, trades
involving a few large operations that overcomply
and sell the credits to the smaller ones can dra-
matically lower overall compliance costs while
achieving the same environmental objective. 
An analysis of President Clinton’s 1994 Clean
Water Initiative (CWI) suggested that nutrient
The opportunities for nutrient trading
appear to be enormous. A conservative
estimate suggests that point-nonpoint
trading could be applicable in as many as
900 watersheds in the United States.
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trading could lower the cost of implementing
the initiative by $658 million to $7.5 billion,
based on total incremental costs estimated to
range from $5 billion to $9.6 billion. The bulk
of these savings (75 to 92 percent) would be
realized from point-nonpoint trading, while the
remaining savings were expected to come from
point-point trading (USEPA, 1994). 
Two other possible options for nutrient trad-
ing include pretreatment trading, where a
municipal plant pays a facility that is discharg-
ing into its system to reduce its contribution
rather than upgrading the system itself. Non-
point-nonpoint trading, another option, is possi-
ble in theory, but practical examples do not exist. 
In short, nutrient trading may represent a
vast untapped reservoir to resolve the nation’s
water quality problems, but significant imple-
mentation and performance issues must be
tackled. 
An analysis of President Clinton’s 1994
Clean Water Initiative suggested that
nutrient trading could lower the cost of
implementing the initiative by $658
million to $7.5 billion.
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N utrient trading is widely thought toreduce the costs of improving waterquality, but there is little economic
analysis comparing trading with other policy
approaches. Of the work done to date, most
studies simply compare average costs of various
forms of nutrient reduction for point and non-
point sources.
In the course of this study, we developed a
comprehensive analytical framework to com-
pare the economic and environmental perfor-
mance of alternative policy strategies to reduce
nutrient loads. In particular, we explored oppor-
tunities to reduce phosphorus loads in three
watersheds of the Upper Midwest: the Saginaw
Bay in Michigan, the Rock River in Wisconsin,
and the Minnesota River Valley. (See Figure 3.)
The intent of the analysis was to develop and
implement a policy tool to explore the cost-
effectiveness and environmental performance
of various strategies to improve water quality in
specific watersheds. In doing this, we hoped to
illuminate the economic issues, to facilitate the
development of successful pilot nutrient trading
programs, and to better understand the oppor-
tunities and barriers to improving water quality
under each of the policy approaches considered.
THE CASES: NUTRIENT TRADING
IN MINNESOTA, MICHIGAN,
AND WISCONSIN
These cases were chosen because each area has
significant water quality problems and the
responsible state agency was interested in
exploring nutrient trading as a policy alterna-
tive. The study is a joint effort of the World
Resources Institute; the Michigan, Wisconsin,
and Minnesota state environmental protection
agencies; and various stakeholders in each
watershed, including point source operators,
farmers, environmental groups, and academics.
In each of these three states, there has been sig-
nificant movement toward the use of trading.
Background
Notwithstanding requirements to upgrade point
source discharges and the development of non-
point source programs, nutrient pollution in the
Minnesota River has been a chronic problem for
years. In 1988, the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (MPCA) established a Total Maximum
Daily Load (TMDL) on the lower 25 miles of the
N U T R I E N T  T R A D I N G
O P P O R T U N I T I E S  I N  T H R E E
W A T E R S H E D S  O F  T H E  U P P E R
M I D W E S T
4
These three cases were chosen because each
area has significant water quality problems
and the responsible state agency was
interested in exploring nutrient trading as
a policy alternative.
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Minnesota River, limiting chemical and biologi-
cal oxygen demand (BOD) and ammonia nitro-
gen (USEPA, 1992b). Phosphorus control is
now under active regulatory consideration by the
MPCA. A study of point source treatment found
that incremental costs for phosphorus control
range from about $15 million to $39 million per
year (Metcalf and Eddy et al., 1993). A prelimi-
nary study done for EPA in 1987 identified the
basin as a good candidate for a trading program
(Industrial Economics, 1987).
Recently this interest materialized in the form
of a trade tied to a new permit. In January
1997, Minnesota Governor Arne Carlson
announced a new discharge permit for the Rahr
Malting Company that allows the company to
build its own wastewater treatment facility on a
tightly regulated stretch of the Minnesota River
in exchange for reducing nonpoint source dis-
charges upstream from the plant (MPCA,
1997a). Under the terms of the agreement,
Rahr can support agricultural conservation
F I G U R E  3 .
FERTILE GROUND: NUTRIENT TRADING’S POTENTIAL TO COST-EFFECTIVELY IMPROVE WATER QUALITY
21
practices including soil erosion controls, live-
stock exclusion from waterways, rotational graz-
ing, critical-area set asides, and wetland treat-
ment systems for nutrient removal. Credits that
Rahr receives from these practices can be
applied against the load of its new facility.
Detailed papers outline how the amount of
credit from various practices is to be calculated
(MPCA, 1997b, 1997c,1997d).
Michigan has developed rules for a voluntary
statewide “water quality” trading program and
is conducting a demonstration project on the
Kalamazoo River.7 The Kalamazoo project is
intended to help the state and a group of stake-
holders obtain design information for develop-
ment of the statewide program (Michigan DEQ,
1998a). The Water Quality Trading Group in
Michigan has drafted an extensive Water Qual-
ity Trading Rule to enable it to move forward
and implement the demonstration program
(Michigan DEQ, 1998b). The draft has been
submitted to the Region V office of the USEPA;
discussions are continuing on the merits of the
draft rule.
Though Michigan ultimately chose to imple-
ment a pilot program in the Kalamazoo River
watershed, Saginaw Bay was chosen as the
most appropriate case for this study. Saginaw
Bay has been the focus of water quality
improvement efforts by the state of Michigan
for more than 15 years. The state has sponsored
several studies and made major efforts to
reduce nutrient loads; the latest effort is the
Saginaw Bay Soil Erosion and Sedimentation
Control Program. Because Saginaw Bay has
been the subject of prior studies, the informa-
tion necessary to complete a research effort on
nutrient trading was generally available and
comparative analysis was possible. According to
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
staff, the analysis presented here was a key fac-
tor in the state’s determination to undertake a
statewide program (Batchelor, 1999).
According to both the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources and the U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, the Rock River is a water
body that does not attain its designated uses. As
such, the river is subject to a limit on the allow-
able load of pollutants it can receive, including
phosphorus.
In response to a proposed rule to require all
the point sources in the Rock River watershed to
adopt phosphorus controls, a group of point
source dischargers called the Rock River Partner-
ship petitioned the secretary of the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources to grant them
an extension so that a nutrient trading program
could be tried in the watershed. The partnership
has assessed its membership according to their
size in order to raise funds to pay for hydrologi-
cal modeling and monitoring of the basin. In
1996, the governor’s budget included funds to
study nutrient trading in four watersheds, the
Rock River among them. These pilot programs
are intended to help develop a statewide frame-
work for trading (Michigan DEQ, 1998a).
Table 4 summarizes EPA’s vulnerability indi-
cators for the 23 sub-basins found in the three
watersheds in the present study. The data show
the nature of the water quality problems. Just
one of the sub-basins have “best” or “better”
condition, while three quarters have “more
serious” conditions (a five or six rating, with six
Michigan has developed rules for a
voluntary statewide “water quality”
trading program and is conducting a
demonstration project on the Kalamazoo
River.
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being the worst possible rating). Just one sub-
basin is highly vulnerable to urban runoff,
while 19 are highly vulnerable to agricultural
runoff. A few sub-basins are vulnerable to “pop-
ulation change” (meaning growth) and the indi-
cators show that many are moderately vulnera-
T A B L E  4 . S U B - B A S I N  V U L N E R A B I L I T Y  I N D I C E S  B Y  W A T E R S H E D
Index of
Aquatic Urban Agricultural
Overall Species Runoff Runoff Population Hydrologic
Sub-Basin Name Condition at Risk Potential Potential Change Modification
Saginaw Bay Watershed
Au Gres-Rifle 1 Low Low Moderate High Moderate
Kawkawlin-Pine 5 n/a Low Moderate Low Low
Pigeon-Wiscoggin 5 Moderate Low High Low Low
Tittabawassee 3 Low Low Moderate Moderate Moderate
Pine 5 Low Low High Low Moderate
Shiawassee 5 Moderate Low High Moderate Moderate
Flint 4 n/a Low High Low Moderate
Cass 5 Low Moderate High Low Low
Saginaw 5 Low Low Moderate Low n/a
Minnesota River Watershed
Upper Minnesota 3 Low Low High Low Moderate
Pomme De Terre 5 Low Low High Low Moderate
Lac Qui Parle 5 n/a Low High Low Moderate
Hawk-Yellow Medicine 3 Moderate Low High Low Moderate
Chippewa 5 n/a Low High Low Moderate
Redwood 5 n/a Low High Low Low
Middle Minnesota 5 Moderate Low High Moderate Moderate
Cottonwood 5 Moderate Low High Low Low
Blue Earth 5 Moderate Low High Low Moderate
Watonwan 5 n/a Low High Low Moderate
Le Sueur 5 n/a Low High Low Moderate
Lower Minnesota 6 High Low High High Moderate
Rock River Watershed
Upper Rock 4 Moderate Moderate High High High
Crawfish 5 Low Moderate High Moderate Moderate
Source: Environmental Protection Agency, “Surf Your Watershed” website.
Notes: The overall condition describes the health of the aquatic resources for each watershed. The score is the result of combining 15 indi-
cators of watershed condition and vulnerability, zero being the best water quality or condition, and 6 being the most serious condition.
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ble to hydrologic modification such as dams.
Not shown here, Kawkawlin-Pine is highly vul-
nerable to conventional loads over permitted
levels. Most other basins have low vulnerability
to toxic or conventional loads over permitted
levels. For various reasons, only one sub-basin
attains its designated uses.
Point Sources and Control Options
The three watersheds have a number of things
in common and a few important differences.
Three key differences are the number of point
sources in each watershed, the variation in their
size distribution, and their level of treatment.
Figure 4 shows the number and size distribu-
tion for each watershed. In Minnesota, 211 facil-
ities release phosphorus into the Minnesota
River. They range in size from a few thousand
gallons per day to 26 million gallons per day
(mgd), with a total flow of 130 mgd. The two
largest municipal plants in the region have
flows of 26 mgd and 21 mgd. The vast majority
of the plants on the river are considerably
smaller; most of the flow is concentrated in a
few facilities. Of the total, 199 have a flow of
less than 1 mgd and 126 have a flow less than
0.1 mgd. Only the two largest plants currently
have phosphorus control. 
The average concentration of phosphorus in
effluent from all point sources in the watershed
is 1.76 parts per million8 (ppm), according to
estimates made using Minnesota Pollution Con-
trol Agency (MPCA) data. The total phosphorus
Minnesota River Saginaw Bay Rock River
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load to the watershed from these sources is
about 348 tons per year. 
Sixty point source dischargers release phos-
phorus into the Rock River in Wisconsin. They
range in size from 30,000 gallons per day to 40
million gallons per day at Madison, which is by
far the largest plant. The majority of the plants
on the river are small, but there is a much
greater proportion of large plants than in Min-
nesota. Of the total, 16 have a flow of more than
1 mgd and 35 have a flow less than 0.25 mgd.
Only Madison’s municipal wastewater treatment
plant has phosphorus control. Under the pro-
posed state regulation (NR217), plants with loads
less than about 1,300 pounds per year would not
have to reduce P loadings. This means that 25 of
the 60 dischargers would have no obligation to
comply under the proposed rule.
The average concentration of phosphorus in
effluent from point sources in the watershed
subject to the regulation is about 2.7 ppm,
according to estimates derived from Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources (WDNR)
data. The total phosphorus load to the water-
shed from these sources is about 401 tons per
year. The point sources that are not subject to
the regulation contribute an additional 14 tons
per year of phosphorus, or 3 percent of the total
point source load.
The Minnesota and Rock Rivers drain into
the Mississippi, but Saginaw Bay is part of
the Great Lakes system. For this reason, only
the facilities in that watershed have had to
adopt treatment for phosphorus removal.
There are 69 point source dischargers with
permits to release phosphorus into the Sagi-
naw Bay Watershed. They range in size from
an average of a few thousand gallons per day
to 89 million gallons per day. The largest
municipal wastewater treatment plants in the
region are Saginaw (25 mgd) and Flint (28
mgd). There are few plants smaller than 0.1
mgd in the basin and a large proportion of
relatively large facilities.
By law, the standard concentration limit for
phosphorus in effluent that flows into the Great
Lakes is 1 ppm, though some plants have
tighter restrictions or have voluntarily achieved
lower limits. The average concentration of
phosphorus in effluent from all point sources
in the watershed is 0.74 ppm, according to data
reported to the Michigan Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality (MDEQ) by dischargers. The
total phosphorus load to the watershed from
these sources is about 321 tons per year.
Point Source Controls and Costs
For sources that have been subject to phosphorus
limits for some time, as in Michigan, the stan-
dard method of control has been chemical phos-
phorus removal. In this method, metal salts of
aluminum and iron are added to waste streams
to form compounds that precipitate phosphorus
from the wastewater. For effluent limitations of 1
ppm, metal salt additions in conjunction with
conventional clarifiers do an acceptable job. It is
possible to reduce phosphorus levels to 0.5 ppm
in the effluent by adding more metal salt, but to
achieve limits of 0.2 ppm it is necessary to use
secondary filtration with either chemical or bio-
logical treatment. (See Table 5.)
Biological phosphorus removal is a relatively
new technology. There are at least six different
types of biological phosphorus removal sys-
tems; all rely on biota to remove excess phos-
phorus from the waste stream during their
growth processes. For most point sources with
existing chemical treatment, biological phos-
phorus removal cannot be technically accom-
modated, so these plants are locked into higher
control cost options. Because costs are lower,
most new plants use biological treatment
processes.
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For this analysis, we characterized six cate-
gories of treatment:
1. no treatment;
2. standard chemical phosphorus removal;
3. maximum chemical phosphorus removal
possible without filtration;
4. chemical phosphorus removal with filtration; 
5. biological phosphorus removal; and
6. biological phosphorus removal with
filtration.
For each of these treatment options, we used
cost curves developed especially for this study
to estimate costs for operation, maintenance,
and sludge removal (OM&R), as well as capital
costs to upgrade plants (Doran, 1997). Biologi-
cal phosphorus removal is the least expensive
option for point sources that currently have no
treatment. For a 1 mgd plant, the cost of build-
ing a chemical phosphorus removal system is
approximately $1.25 million. For the same size
plant, a biological process would cost about $1
million. For both of these types of plants, costs
per unit of treatment as measured by water flow
decline significantly as the size of the plant
increases. The costs of adding filtration to
chemical or biological phosphorus removal
processes is the same, about $2.5 million to
capital costs for a 1 mgd plant. 
Biological phosphorus removal processes have
an advantage in total operation, maintenance and
sludge removal costs, primarily because there is
less sludge produced with biological processes.
For a chemical process, the annual costs in this
category are about $60,000 per mgd plant size
T A B L E  5 . N U M B E R  O F  P L A N T S  I N  E A C H  W A T E R S H E D  B Y
P H O S P H O R U S  ( P )  T R E A T M E N T  T Y P E
Minnesota River Valley Saginaw Bay Rock River
No treatment 209 21a 34b
Standard chemical 0 21 0
Maximum chemical 0 17 0
Chemical with filtration 0 10 0
Biological 2 0 1
Biological with filtration 0 0 0
Total for Watershed 211 69 60
Average concentration of P in 
effluent (ppm) 1.76 0.74 2.7
Total Point Source P Load 348 321 401
Notes:
a. These sources meet the discharge standard without treatment.
b. Of this number, 25 plants are too small to meet the minimum compliance requirements.
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with no economy of scale. For biological removal,
the comparable cost is $35,000 per year, with
declining costs per unit of water treated as plants
get larger. The additional OM&R costs for filtra-
tion for either process are about $80,000 per
year, with a small decrease in unit costs as plants
get bigger.9
Nonpoint Sources and Load 
Reduction Options
The watersheds of Saginaw Bay, the Minnesota
River Valley, and the Rock River are quite simi-
lar in the dominance of agriculture in land use
and phosphorus loads. As Table 6 shows, agri-
culture accounts for 47 to 76 percent of the
total land use in each case. Pasture, urban, and
other uses make up relatively small shares of
land. Saginaw Bay has a heavily forested north-
ern end, but in the other two cases forest land
is not a large land use category. The Minnesota
River Valley is the most rural of the three cases,
with just 2 percent of the land in urban uses. 
Corn for grain or silage is the dominant crop
in each watershed, with almost 4 million acres
in the Minnesota River watershed, 1 million in
Saginaw Bay, and just over 600,000 acres in
the Rock River. The Minnesota River Valley is
the northern end of the Corn Belt, and the
corn-soybean rotation is common there. Three
million acres of soybeans were grown there in
1992. Soybeans are important in Saginaw Bay,
with about 450,000 acres grown, but are much
less important in the Rock River watershed,
where pasture and hay are the second most
important agricultural land uses. In all these
cases, wheat, oats, barley, and other crops
account for much smaller shares of the land
used for agricultural production.
Phosphorus loads originate not only from
point source discharges, but also from a variety
of nonpoint sources such as agriculture, other
The watersheds of Saginaw Bay, the
Minnesota River Valley, and the Rock River
are quite similar in the dominance of
agriculture in land use and phosphorus loads.
T A B L E  6 . L A N D  U S E  F O R  E A C H  W A T E R S H E D  ( P E R C E N T A G E S  I N  P A R E N T H E S E S )
Land Use (1,000 acres)
Cropland Pasture Forestry Urban Total
Minnesota River 7,636 692 279 231 10,842
(70) (6) (3) (2)
Saginaw Bay 2,246 409 1,522 476 5,592
(40) (7) (27) (9)
Rock River 1,413 203 159 235 2,420
(58) (8) (7) (10)
Source: 1992 National Resources Inventory (USDA, 1994).
Note: Watershed totals include other land use categories not shown such as transportation, water, federal, minor and
miscellaneous uses.
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land uses such as forestry, and urban runoff
from golf courses, pets, and septic systems. A
principal mechanism by which phosphorus
reaches surface waters is through erosion, as
phosphorus attaches to soil particles and is car-
ried away in surface runoff from the land. 
Agricultural land use is the major source of
phosphorus for each of the watersheds included
in this study. These results agree with EPA
water quality assessments (USEPA, 1998). (See
Table 4.) Analysis of erosion and expected phos-
phorus runoff from nonagricultural land (using
standard technical coefficients) suggests that
nonagricultural nonpoint sources are relatively
minor contributors to the P load in these water-
sheds compared to other sources (Horner et al.,
1994). 
Because of agriculture’s dominance in water
quality problems, we used a more detailed
methodology for estimating loadings from agri-
cultural sources. This methodology was devel-
oped and peer reviewed as part of an earlier
study done by the World Resources Institute to
explore national policy options to enhance agri-
culture’s economic and environmental perfor-
mance (Faeth, 1995). The methods and data
were adapted and extended to make them suit-
able for a watershed-level study.
To capture the impacts from agriculture, we
looked at land use within the sub-basins of
each watershed and developed alternatives for
crop production systems commonly used
within the region. Just as for point sources, the
data collection was intended to describe the
financial and environmental characteristics of
cropping practices used in the watershed. This
includes the principal crops grown, the rota-
tions in which they are grown, and the tillage
practices used.
The information used for this analysis came
from a variety of USDA databases, including
the Cropping Practices Survey, which is a state-
level survey of farmers and the practices they
use. From this information we identified all
important production inputs and their levels of
use for each crop rotation and tillage practice.
Unfortunately, this source of information only
covers the major field crops: corn, wheat, soy-
beans, hay, silage, barley, and oats. There is no
similar source of production data for vegetables,
sugar beets or other minor crops, so these are
not included in the analysis. This is not a seri-
ous problem, however, because the crops cov-
ered account for 80 to 92 percent of cultivated
cropland and erosion rates are similar for those
crops included and excluded. To account for all
loadings from agricultural land, we inflated the
acreage of the crops included to equal the total
for all cropland. From the 1992 National
Resources Inventory, we have been able to iden-
tify the acreage of various cropping rotations
and the acreage of each crop grown in each
sub-basin (USDA, 1994b). 
Tillage is critically important in determining
the amount of soil that erodes from cropping
activities, so we also represented five different
tillage types:
• mold board plowing, which completely
overturns the soil and leaves little or no
residue to prevent erosion by wind or
water;
A principal mechanism by which
phosphorus reaches surface waters is
through erosion, as phosphorus attaches
to soil particles and is carried away in
surface runoff from the land. 
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• conventional tillage, which uses a variety of
implements such as disks and chisels but
excludes the mold board and leaves some
residue, but not much; 
• mulch tillage, which leaves over 30 percent
of the surface covered by residue to prevent
runoff; 
• no-til, which avoids tillage altogether, leaving
all of the crop residue on the surface, cut-
ting erosion by up to 90 percent; and
• ridge tillage, which uses built-up ridges
within the field to intercept runoff and
encourage percolation. 
Tillage data were obtained from the Conserva-
tion Tillage Information Center county-level sum-
maries and combined with the NRI crop rotation
data to characterize the production alternatives
available in each watershed. In total, we represent
10 rotations and four tillage types in 18 combina-
tions.10 Each of these combinations is also repre-
sented by the average nutrient use levels obtained
from survey data and a nutrient management
alternative that reduces fertilizer use to levels rec-
ommended by county extension agents. 
The amount of conservation tillage, mulch,
no-til, and ridge tillage varies for each water-
shed. About 15 percent of cropland is in some
form of conservation tillage in the Rock River
watershed, compared to 25 percent for the Min-
nesota River Valley and Saginaw Bay. The Rock
River and Saginaw Bay have appreciably higher
rates of mold board plow usage.
Environmental impact data such as soil ero-
sion rates and nutrient loadings were estimated
for each cropping alternative using a biophysi-
cal simulation model, EPIC, developed by the
USDA (Williams et al., 1989). The results from
the simulation model were calibrated to data
from the county and sub-basin level. Crop
yields and crop acreages were calibrated using
county averages from the state agricultural sta-
tistics services and the 1992 U.S. Census of
Agriculture (USDA, 1997b).
Soil erosion rates for erosion by water (sheet
and rill) and by wind were also calibrated so that
the simulated totals for each sub-basin match
totals estimated by the USDA’s National
Resources Inventory. Table 7 shows these ero-
sion estimates, which use 1992 data. According
to USDA, cropland soil erosion by wind is much
larger than sheet and rill erosion for the Min-
nesota River Valley and Saginaw Bay. Values for
the Rock River were not reported by the NRI. 
USDA (Ribaudo, 1992) has estimated dam-
ages caused by sediment from sheet and rill
erosion in 10 regions. Using a value for the
The value of damages caused by just sheet
and rill erosion is $84 million per year in
the Minnesota River Valley watershed, $13
million in Saginaw Bay, and $29 million
in the Rock River.
Tillage is critically important in
determining the amount of soil that erodes
from cropping activities. About 15 percent
of cropland is in some form of conservation
tillage in the Rock River watershed,
compared to 25 percent for the Minnesota
River Valley and Saginaw Bay.
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Great Lakes region of $5.07 per ton of soil
eroded (1995 dollars), the value of damages
caused by just sheet and rill erosion is $84
million per year in the Minnesota River Valley
watershed, $13 million in Saginaw Bay, and $29
million in the Rock River. 
Soil erosion is the principal means by which
phosphorus from agricultural sources reaches
rivers. However, not all soil erosion is a cause of
environmental harm, because most eroded soil
moves a short distance and does not reach a
ditch, creek, or river where it can cause a prob-
lem. The Institute of Water Research at the
Michigan State University (MSU) developed
estimates for this study of the amount of sheet
and rill erosion in each sub-basin that reaches a
waterway (Ouyang and Bartholic, 1997). There
are five methods for estimating these delivery
ratios. MSU generated estimates using all five.
We used the mean value of the five for the
analysis. These “sediment delivery ratios” were
used to estimate loads to the river by multiply-
ing the acreage in a given practice by the
amount of phosphorus attached to sediment for
that practice. The range of delivery ratios for the
sub-basins in each watershed are shown in
Table 7.
Soil deposition by wind erosion is potentially a
major source of phosphorus loading, given that
wind erosion in the two cases where data exist is
more than double sheet and rill erosion by
water. Unfortunately, there is no method to esti-
mate deposition of soil eroded by wind. For the
Minnesota and Rock Rivers, we assumed a sedi-
ment delivery ratio for wind of 3 percent, which
is approximately the area covered by water in
these watersheds. For the Saginaw Bay, the pre-
vailing winds flow from west to east over the
bay, meaning that erosion from wind is likely to
have a significant impact on the load. One study
for a similar situation, the Chesapeake Bay,
showed wind erosion deposition to the water-
shed to be 9 percent. We estimated that 10 per-
cent of wind-eroded soils were deposited in the
Saginaw watershed. Local soil conservationists
believe this is a conservative estimate.
As noted earlier, animal production is also
believed to be a large source of water contami-
nation. Unfortunately, there are no good meth-
ods to estimate the environmental impacts of
different forms of animal production or waste
remediation options explicitly. In practice,
manure from animal production is spread on
agricultural fields as a nutrient source, and
T A B L E  7 . S O I L  E R O S I O N  F R O M  C R O P L A N D  A N D  D E L I V E R Y  R A T I O S  B Y
W A T E R S H E D
Sheet and Rill Sediment Delivery
Erosion Ratio for Sheet and Wind Erosion Total Soil Erosion
Watershed 1,000 tons per year) Rill Erosion (1,000 tons per year) (1,000 tons per year)
Minnesota River 16,484 0.138 – 0.206 34,543 51,027
Saginaw Bay 2,640 0.171 – 0.216 6,702 9,342
Rock River 5,793 0.157 – 0.171 No estimate 5,793
Source: Erosion data, 1992 National Resources Inventory, USDA; delivery ratios, Ouyang and Bartholic, 1997.
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erosion control, while not the only factor, is
important in determining the ultimate disposi-
tion of the waste. Assuming that animal
manure is all applied to cropland, then the load
from animal operations should be reflected in
the agricultural cropland load estimates.
Total Load Estimates
Putting the point source and nonpoint source
information together and simulating the base-
line land use, we produced a baseload estimate
for each watershed by sub-basin. The estimates
by sub-basin vary considerably depending on
the number and size and treatment of point
sources and land use. The total and breakout by
source category for each watershed is shown in
Figure 5. 
In each of the three case studies, the phos-
phorus loads from agriculture are the domi-
nant source, ranging from 51 to 69 percent of
the total estimated load. The total phosphorus
load for the Minnesota River Valley was cali-
brated to estimates made by the MPCA. Since
the point-source loads are reported by each
facility, the adjustment was made to the non-
point source loads. For Saginaw Bay, our
results compare well to a prior study done by
Limno-Tech (1983) that estimated total phos-
phorus loads to the Bay at 989 tons per year.
For the Rock River, the approach we used com-
pared well with per-acre load averages esti-
mated by hydrological models.
In each of the three case studies, the
phosphorus loads from agriculture are the
dominant source, ranging from 51 to 69
percent of the total estimated load.
Nonpoint Agricultural Source LoadOther Nonpoint Source Load Point Source Load
Minnesota River Saginaw Bay Rock River
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W orking with our partner organizations,we used a modeling framework devel-oped for this study to analyze the eco-
nomic and environmental potential of alterna-
tive policy approaches. Some of the assumptions
were tailored to the data available in each water-
shed. The scenarios reported here are the same
to allow cross-watershed comparisons. Since
phosphorus is the principal pollutant of interest
in each of these cases, we focus on phosphorus
load reductions.
THE LEAST-COST SOLUTION
In the first set of scenarios, we asked the sim-
ple question, “What is the least-cost solution for
a given level of phosphorus load reduction?”
The cost curves developed through this exercise
provide a benchmark to measure the cost-effec-
tiveness of other policy tests. From an economic
point of view, the least-cost solution presents
the ideal. The goal is to identify those policies
that meet the environmental objectives and are
as close as possible to the least-cost result. 
Figure 6 shows least-cost curves for each
watershed. These were obtained by running the
model at total load reductions of 10, 33, 50 per-
cent and at the maximum potentially attainable
for each watershed. The maximum load reduc-
tion is different in each case because of the
unique characteristics of each watershed. For
each of these runs the model found the point
source and cropping practice options that mini-
mize the total cost to produce a load reduction
of the specified amount; no policy constraints
were applied. 
As shown in Figure 6, significant load reduc-
tions are possible at very low costs. Costs
increase slowly until a reduction of 50 percent
is achieved, and then rise rapidly thereafter. The
difference in costs is attributable to the fact that
at lower levels of load reductions there are a
number of relatively minor agricultural changes
that can dramatically cut phosphorus loads. For
example, for a cut of up to 10 percent, the prin-
cipal shift would be from moldboard plowing to
conventional tillage without the moldboard. The
elimination of moldboard plowing would dra-
matically cut erosion—and therefore phospho-
rus loads—at a very low cost. At further load
reductions, conventional tillage would be
reduced and conservation tillage practices
would become dominant. There would also be
an increased move to nutrient management
practices as greater reductions are demanded.
E C O N O M I C  R E S U L T S
5
We asked the simple question, “What is
the least-cost solution for a given level of
phosphorus load reduction?”
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On the point source side, at relatively low
reduction requirements, a few of the larger
sources that have no systems treatment adopt
biological or chemical phosphorus removal. As
loads decrease, more plants adopt a removal
process and those that have chemical removal
reduce their loads by adding more of the chemi-
cal to the process, incurring only somewhat
greater OM&R costs. Finally, at the maximum
achievable reduction level, all point sources
have adopted filtration, incurring the highest
level of capital upgrade and greater OM&R
costs. Reductions beyond the endpoint of the
curves are not possible because at this point all
point sources and agricultural options to reduce
loads are employed to the fullest extent speci-
fied by the dataset. The opportunities for reduc-
tions are exhausted earlier for Saginaw Bay
because a 1 ppm standard for phosphorus is
already in place. The Minnesota River shows
the highest eventual costs because of the pre-
dominance of small treatment facilities and the
high unit costs of additional treatment. 
POLICY TESTS 
We tested several policy options that would typi-
cally be considered for situations like those pre-
sented by the three case studies. These were
intended to contribute to the discussion on
trading and were not endorsed by any state
agencies. These tests include:
• A point source performance requirement. Point
source controls have been the first avenue
of attack to correct water quality problems.
This scenario asks: “What if we do more of
the same?” This scenario is a policy baseline
for comparative purposes. We assumed in
this scenario that all point sources would be
forced to adopt a new standard for phospho-
rus, except in the case of Wisconsin, where
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the smallest dischargers would be exempted
as a cost-saving measure. In Minnesota and
Wisconsin, the standard would be 1 ppm.
Michigan already has a standard of 1 ppm
and would go to 0.5 ppm.
• A conventional subsidy program for agricul-
tural conservation “best management practices”
(BMPs). Instead of regulatory controls on
agriculture, most of the policy effort in the
U.S. has focused on providing subsidies to
farmers to help reduce the costs of imple-
menting best management practices
(BMPs). In this vein, this scenario provides
a subsidy for mulch tillage, no-til, and nutri-
ent management. We adjusted the subsidy
level (unique in each case) until it induced
an agricultural load reduction for the water-
shed equal to that for the point source per-
formance requirement.
• A point source performance requirement cou-
pled with trading. What if point sources
could trade with other point and nonpoint
sources to meet the new standard? This sce-
nario adds point and nonpoint trading flexi-
bility to the first scenario.
• A trading program coupled with performance-
based conservation subsidies. This scenario
combines elements of the second and third
scenarios, where the burden of reductions is
shared between point source and nonpoint
sources. A key difference however, would be
that the conservation subsidies would be
based upon the attainment of least-cost load
reductions however achieved, not the adop-
tion of any particular BMP. For nonpoint
source reductions that are applied to non-
point source obligations, there is no trading
ratio applied.
Table 8 shows the cost results for all the case
studies. Additional details for each case are
shown in Tables 9a through 9c. In each case,
the strategy of tightening point source perfor-
mance requirements is the most expensive
T A B L E  8 . C O S T  O F  P H O S P H O R U S  C O N T R O L  U N D E R  D I F F E R E N T  P O L I C I E S
( U S $  P E R  P O U N D  O F  P H O S P H O R U S  R E M O V E D )
Conventional Trading
Subsidies for Point Program with
Point Agricultural Source Performance-
Source Conservation Performance based 
Performance Practices Requirement Conservation Least-cost
Requirement (BMPs) with Trading Subsidies Solution
Minnesota River 19.57 16.29 6.84 4.45 4.36
Saginaw Bay 23.89 5.76 4.04 2.90 1.75
Rock River 10.38 9.53 5.95 3.82 3.22
Source: The levels of phosphorus reduction from the base are different for each watershed.
In each case, the strategy of tightening
point source performance requirements is
the most expensive option.
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T A B L E  9 a . S C E N A R I O  R E S U LT S — M I N N E S O T A  R I V E R  V A L L E Y
Point Source Conventional Trading 
Performance Subsidies for Point Source Program with
Requirement Agricultural Performance Performance-
(1ppm for Conservation Requirement based Conservation Least-cost
phosphorus) Practices (BMPs) with Trading Subsidies Solution
Total P Load 
Reduction (percent) 20 20 29 20 20
Point Source P Load 
Reduction (percent) 70 0 55 35 30
Agricultural P Load 
Reduction (percent) 0 30 20 15 17
Total Costs ($M/yr) 9.58 8.06 5.01 2.21 2.15
Average Cost per 
Pound ($/lb.P) 19.57 16.29 7.10 4.50 4.36
T A B L E  9 b . S C E N A R I O  R E S U LT S — R O C K  R I V E R  W A T E R S H E D
Point Source Conventional Trading 
Performance Subsidies for Point Source Program with 
Requirement Agricultural Performance Performance-
(1ppm for Conservation Requirement based Conservation Least-cost
phosphorus) Practices (BMPs) with Trading Subsidies Solution
Total P Load 
Reduction (percent) 30 70 40 30 30
Point Source P Load 
Reduction (percent) 71 0 59 35 24
Agricultural P Load 
Reduction (percent) 0 58 29 29 39
Total Costs ($M/yr) 5.9 5.4 4.5 2.2 1.8
Average Cost per 
Pound ($/lb.P) 10.38 9.53 5.95 3.82 3.22
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option. Costs across the studies vary consider-
ably, however. Saginaw Bay results are the high-
est because there is an existing requirement of
1 ppm in place and the requirement simulated
here is for 0.5 ppm instead of 1 ppm as in the
other studies. Minnesota River results are also
relatively high because there are so many small
sources. In contrast, in the Rock River the
smallest sources are exempt and the costs are
quite a bit lower for the same level of control.
Tables 9a-c show estimates for load reduc-
tions under each policy test. The new regulatory
requirements on point sources provide a cut in
the point source load of 70, 71, and 49 percent,
respectively for Minnesota River, the Rock
River, and Saginaw Bay. These reductions work
out to cuts in the total load of 20, 30, and 16
percent. Again, less potential is available from
point source reductions in Saginaw Bay because
phosphorus is already controlled.
A conventional conservation subsidy program
for agricultural BMPs is somewhat better at
achieving the same result, but is still relatively
expensive except in Saginaw Bay, where wind
erosion is such a problem and soil conservation
has a greater benefit. The costs of achieving the
same amount of load reduction through untar-
geted agricultural subsidies for conservation
tillage practices is lower than the point source
regulation approach, but still more expensive
than other options. Costs are comparatively
greater in the Minnesota River because there is
more adoption of conservation tillage in this
watershed and wind erosion, unlike Saginaw, is
less of a problem. There is also greater use of
the moldboard plow, the most erosive practice,
in the Rock River. These characteristics provide
less expensive remediation opportunities. 
If agriculture achieved the same absolute cuts
as new point source performance requirements,
T A B L E  9 c . S C E N A R I O  R E S U LT S — S A G I N A W  B A Y
Point Source Conventional Trading 
Performance Subsidies for Point Source Program with 
Requirement Agricultural Performance Performance-
(1ppm for Conservation Requirement based Conservation Least-cost
phosphorus) Practices (BMPs) with Trading Subsidies Solution
Total P Load 
Reduction (percent) 16 16 27 18 16
Point Source P Load 
Reduction (percent) 49 0 36 21 0
Agricultural P Load 
Reduction (percent) 0 28 27 20 27
Total Costs ($M/yr) 7.47 1.80 2.14 1.06 0.55
Average Cost per 
Pound ($/lb.P) 23.89 5.76 4.04 2.90 1.75
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the percentage load reduction would be less
because the agricultural load in each case com-
prises a larger share of the total. We compared
the cost per acre required in the model to bring
in more conservation tillage with the costs actu-
ally paid under existing government programs.
In each case, the results were quite close to the
actual. 
Compared to the least-cost solution, both of
these approaches are expensive. The least-cost
solution relies on performance objectives to
achieve the desired result and is otherwise
unconstrained. The first two policy tests are
obviously quite far from the most cost-effective
result. In the case of new point source require-
ments, the reason is that there are many small
point sources with diseconomies of scale and
therefore expensive remediation costs com-
pared to agriculture. The agricultural conserva-
tion subsidy program favors certain practices
without regard to performance and is therefore
relatively inefficient. The least-cost solution rep-
resents the equivalent of a highly targeted per-
formance-based subsidy program. The least-cost
solution ranges from 69 to 93 percent lower
compared to tighter regulatory standards on
point sources and from 66 to 73 percent lower
than untargeted BMP subsidies. 
In contrast, point source performance require-
ments, coupled with flexibility to decide whether
to treat or trade with point or nonpoint sources,
would lower costs considerably. In this case, the
performance requirement acts as the “cap” in a
“cap and trade” system. This would not repre-
sent a “fully closed” cap and trade program
because not all sources are covered under the
cap. Nevertheless, a point source standard with
trading gets much closer to the least-cost solu-
tion because it allows the point sources to take
advantage of the least expensive remediation
opportunities, wherever they may be found. This
scenario assumes that only one third of the load
reduction from nonpoint sources could be
applied against point source requirements (a 3:1
trading ratio). The rest of the load reduction pro-
duced is essentially an “environmental credit” to
assure the achievement of water quality goals
and account for the greater uncertainty inherent
in nonpoint source loads. The trading ratio pro-
duces a greater total load reduction than any
other policy, an additional 10 percent for each
case. Even with the environmental credit for the
uncertainty of the nonpoint source load applied
to the point source obligations, there is still a
significant savings over the strict regulatory
case. For Saginaw Bay, the costs drop by nearly
$20 per pound—82 percent for the point
sources. The other case shows similar though
less dramatic cost reductions, primarily because
of the phosphorus requirement already in place
in Michigan.
This trading scenario assumes that existing
point sources would pick up the bill to help
clean up threatened rivers, lakes, and estuaries,
raising the question of equity. Is it fair to ask
Point source performance requirements,
coupled with flexibility to decide whether
to treat or trade with point or nonpoint
sources, would lower costs considerably.
Is it fair to ask point sources to pay for
remediation simply because that is where
regulatory control is the strongest and
politically easiest? Should broader social or
sectoral responsibility be sought? 
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point sources to pay for remediation simply
because that is where regulatory control is the
strongest and politically easiest? Should broader
social or sectoral responsibility be sought?
These questions was raised in each of our local
advisory panels.
In response to these issues, we constructed a
scenario that mimics burden sharing. This sce-
nario, “trading with performance-based conser-
vation subsidies,” assumes that the burden for
reductions would be borne evenly by point and
nonpoint sources. In this case, point sources
would be responsible for half of the reduction
level imposed in the other tests. The remaining
reduction is assigned to the agricultural sector.
We assumed for this scenario that the cost for
agricultural reductions would come from con-
servation subsidy program funds. However, the
subsidies would be performance-based, so that
those farmers able to produce the cheapest load
reductions would receive the available funds.
This would mean that farmers closest to
streams, with the most highly erodible soils, or
who had not yet adopted conservation practices
would be the first to receive program funds.
Further, we assumed that point sources could
still purchase nonpoint source reductions.
Because agriculture has its own obligation,
however, and would not trade away its cheapest
reductions, the results show very little point-
nonpoint source trading, but quite a bit of
point-point source trading. This scenario effec-
tively provides a cap for all sources and so is
closer to a “fully closed” trading system.
Here, both point and nonpoint sources con-
tribute evenly to the reduction of phosphorus
loads. While most of the total costs would still
be paid for by point sources, their costs would
be cut considerably compared to the previous
trading scenario and even more compared to a
regulatory standard. For example, in the Rock
River, the cost would be just $3.82 per pound.
The total annual cost estimate to produce this
reduction is about $2.2 million per year, less
than half of the point source trading program
by itself. Of this total cost, about $600,000
would be borne by farmers or by public subsidy
programs. The total cut in the phosphorus load
is less because the trading ratio is not applied to
reductions made by agriculture on its own
behalf, as in the case of the trading program
with caps on point sources only. This scenario
is the closest to achieving the economically
ideal least-cost solution. Point sources still bear
the majority of the costs, but these are the
lowest of any scenario. 
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S U M M A R Y  A N D
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
6
F rom the analysis presented here, it is clearthat if water quality programs aredesigned more efficiently, significant
water quality gains can be achieved at relatively
low cost. A comparison of alternative programs
show that there is a wide range in the cost-effec-
tiveness of different approaches, with conven-
tional strategies showing the least benefit per
dollar spent. More flexible approaches can
potentially provide greater improvements in
water quality, over a larger range of reductions,
and at much lower cost. 
This is not to say that conventional regula-
tory approaches have been a failure in achiev-
ing improvements in water quality; they have
not. But our analysis shows that pushing on
point sources alone would be a relatively
expensive approach when other sources con-
tribute more to the problem. Conversely, in the
agricultural sector the opportunities for inex-
pensive gains are great if conservation subsi-
dies were to be based upon performance, to the
extent that we are able to estimate it. Further,
point sources are not the largest contributor to
the problem in the watersheds we looked at, or
on a national basis. This means that any strat-
egy to reduce the level of loads to restore sur-
face waters must include agriculture, not only
because of economic efficiency arguments, but
also for the sake of fairness. This may not be
true in every watershed, but it appears to be a
dominant situation in many rural and urbaniz-
ing U.S. watersheds.
Because there is a large differential between
remediation costs for conventional approaches
and programs that involve trading of some
form, trading has potential in the watersheds
we considered. One would also expect that there
is potential for trading in many other water-
sheds as well, because the same reasons for
cost-effectiveness would apply. And, as Table 3
shows, there are many watersheds in the
United States that are impaired by nutrients. 
More flexible approaches can potentially
provide greater improvements in water
quality, over a larger range of reductions,
and at much lower cost. 
Any strategy to reduce the level of loads to
restore surface waters must include
agriculture, not only because of economic
efficiency arguments, but also for the sake
of fairness.
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While a regulatory mandate on point sources
coupled with a flexible trading program appears
to have merit, an even better program would
couple these elements with a strategy directly
involving agriculture. In such a program, point-
point and point-nonpoint trading would be
allowed, but nonpoint sources would have a
shared responsibility to undertake remediation
actions not coupled to point source regulatory
requirements. This could take one of several
forms. In one case, agricultural conservation
subsidies, or some share of them, could
become part of the pool of funds available
through a joint trading program. Farmers,
municipalities, or industrial sources who gener-
ated credits could sell them through a single
program sponsored by the government or
another broker in conjunction with point
sources who wished to purchase and apply
credits. Credits purchased by government con-
servation funds would be retired. 
As a second option, farmers could only gener-
ate credits after they had met a minimum stan-
dard for agricultural practices. For example, a
farmer who used a moldboard plow or applied
manure to frozen fields in the wintertime could
not generate credits by abandoning what are
broadly acknowledged to be environmentally
unsound practices. But, farmers moving from
conventional tillage to conservation tillage, or
farmers who currently had sound manure man-
agement practices but wished to install more
advanced ones, could generate credits. Alterna-
tively, farmers moving from practices that were
below standard to ones well above standard
could generate a partial credit. While such a
program requirement would be entirely volun-
tary, it would have the benefit of rewarding
farmers who undertake sound management on
their own, and would still provide an incentive
for farmers who had not yet made the change.
It would have the disadvantage, however, of
reducing cost-effectiveness.
Finally, state agencies could apply a perfor-
mance requirement to all sources, including
agriculture, and allow point sources and farm-
ers the option of meeting the requirement
through trading. Point and nonpoint sources
would have access to the same pool of credits,
and conservation subsidy funds could be
applied as before to offset some part of farmers’
costs or the cost of operating the program.
Farmers who had previously undertaken conser-
vation practices would be in compliance and
have no further obligation. Others who could
make inexpensive reductions would do so, and
perhaps do more than their obligation to sell
credits and recover their costs. Some farmers
with high costs or high-valued crops who
wished to continue their current practices could
purchase credits from point or nonpoint
sources to meet their obligation. 
While trading has economic potential, there
are some uncertainties associated with trading
that need to be acknowledged and accounted
for. The first and perhaps most important
aspect of trading that would involve nonpoint
sources is that there is a great deal of uncer-
tainty involved because the loads are tied to
weather events. While point sources produce
fairly regular flows across seasons and even
years, nonpoint sources do not. Loads are high-
est during rainy seasons and years with high
precipitation, and conversely lower at other
times. For this reason, a reduction in the load
from a nonpoint source may not be equivalent
to that from a point source. Therefore, it is
While trading has economic potential,
there are some uncertainties associated
with trading that need to be acknowledged
and accounted for.
FERTILE GROUND: NUTRIENT TRADING’S POTENTIAL TO COST-EFFECTIVELY IMPROVE WATER QUALITY
41
important that water quality is monitored to
make sure that expected improvements are real-
ized and water quality goals are met. 
A key advantage of the nonpoint source
reductions, however, is that they have other
water quality benefits in addition to the reduc-
tion in phosphorus loadings. For example, in
the point source cap-with-trading scenario, at
the same level of phosphorus reductions neces-
sary to achieve the P load performance there
would also be a one-third reduction in sediment
loads and nitrogen loads for agriculture.
Issues regarding liability must also be care-
fully considered. When a point source fails to
meet a legal requirement, the responsible regu-
latory agency has the ability to force the
offender to comply. Any water quality program
that employs trading must similarly provide a
legal remedy for those instances when someone
sells or applies a credit that has no environmen-
tal value. One way to do this is to have sellers
voluntarily accept the regulatory obligations of
the purchaser for that amount of the load.
Alternatively, the buyer can make the seller a
loan to be paid in credits. If the credits are not
delivered on the specified date, the loan is due
with interest. If the seller cannot provide the
credits himself, he can purchase them on the
market and turn them over.
Another consideration is that trading pro-
grams can be expensive to put in place and
operate if poorly designed. Regulatory paper-
work, information gathering and the process of
identifying partners to trade with can create
transaction costs that are prohibitive and make
a trading program ineffectual. Administrative
oversight needs to be sufficient to ensure good
performance, but not so burdensome as to
inhibit trading. Registration of trades should be
efficient so that partners can easily hook up,
report their trades, and get approval. When
numerous nonpoint sources are involved, some
sort of broker—for example, a cooperative—
needs to be organized to coordinate the sale of
credits and to verify them using standard tech-
niques. For all these reasons, trading should
occur within a regulatory program where rules
and methods are standardized and appropriate
review can be cost-effective, not permit by per-
mit, which is expensive.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The potential of market-based policies to pro-
duce cost savings and environmental progress
appears large enough that much more effort
should be focused on this front. The following
recommendations could help further these
objectives.
1.  The Environmental Protection Agency and
state environmental agencies should allow
trading among industrial and municipal
point sources whenever new nutrient reduc-
tion requirements are put in place. The
issues with point-point trading are fairly
straightforward and can be effectively man-
aged. With the right set of standards, large
cost savings can be achieved, as this study
demonstrates. The standards developed
should be written into regulations and
ensure that the environmental results from a
trade are the same, if not better than that
expected under conventional regulations.
Standards should only allow trading within
Trading should occur within a regulatory
program where rules and methods are
standardized and appropriate review can
be cost-effective, not permit by permit,
which is expensive.
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the watershed that defines the problem to be
addressed and should also set trading ratios
that encourage reductions upstream. Trading
should only result in reduced loads and
improved water quality. In cases where new
requirements are put in place because of a
water quality problem, trading ratios
between point sources should be close to
one. However, if a source wants to increase
its emissions because of expansion or
growth, higher trading ratios should apply so
that a net gain in water quality results. Waste
treatment facilities should not be able to use
trading to stop using capacity already in
place, but trading could be used to allow
facilities to cover inadvertent and infrequent
permit violations. Facilities that have gener-
ally poor records of environmental compli-
ance should be prohibited from trading. 
2. EPA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
should provide much greater regulatory and
financial support for state efforts to develop
point-nonpoint source pilot trading programs
and standards. Pilot trading programs should
be viewed as laboratories to learn how the
potential of point-nonpoint source trading
can be achieved. Such pilots, if properly sup-
ported, could provide cost savings and other
benefits, such as sediment reductions, that
can come from the implementation of better
agricultural practices. Pilots in various set-
tings should be supported through appropri-
ate regulations and aggressively pursued with
technical and financial resources from fed-
eral agencies. Federal and state agencies and
other local stakeholders should participate as
cooperative partners. EPA regional adminis-
trators should provide oversight of these pro-
grams, but allow sufficient flexibility to try
different approaches and help find ways to
make these programs work. Evaluation proce-
dures should be built into pilot programs. If
agreed goals are not met within a reasonable
period, such as one permit period of five
years, the pilots should be terminated and
standard regulatory approaches applied in
that situation.
3. Concentrated animal feeding operations
should be treated the same as industrial and
municipal point sources, which means that
they should face involuntary permitting
processes and tight enforcement. Currently,
confined animal feeding operations smaller
than 1,000 animal units are not regulated in
most states under the Clean Water Act. This is
roughly equivalent to a city of 25,000 to
50,000 people. Cities much smaller than this
do not escape regulatory obligations, and nei-
ther should farmers. Given that domestic live-
stock produce 130 times the waste of humans
in the United States, it is remarkable that only
5,000–10,000 of the 1.1 million farms with
animals have to control their livestock wastes.
With livestock waste trends going in the
wrong direction, the nation will never be able
to improve water quality if such a large source
contributing such a great share of the prob-
lem is left uncontrolled. Minimum animal
waste standards need to be put in place for all
concentrated operations. These would elimi-
nate the most egregious practices such as
drainage and overflow of holding ponds
directly into waterways, application of wastes
onto frozen fields, animal defecation directly
into streams, and overapplication of manure
beyond the ability of crops to use the nutri-
ents. Without exception, large concentrated
animal operations should be treated like point
sources and be subject to the same standards
that apply to municipal and industrial facili-
ties of the same size. They should receive
effluent limitations and be required to adopt
practices to meet these permit-based limits. 
4. Sufficient money from farm income subsidy
programs should be shifted to conservation
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programs so that environmental problems
caused by agriculture can be remediated
using market-based approaches. In 1996,
farm income support programs were
changed so that payments were based on his-
torical payments rather than production. Cut-
ting the link between commodity production
and income payments was a useful change
that will encourage the adoption of cropping
rotations and less monoculture, which is a
good outcome environmentally. However, the
next step needs to be taken—a much greater
share of the billions of dollars spent on unre-
stricted farm income support should be tied
to environmental remediation efforts so that
polluted runoff from agriculture can be con-
tained. Farmers and the nation should come
to a compromise to continue support pay-
ments, but link the payments to environmen-
tal improvements. The programs should
employ market-based mechanisms such as
auctions, which ensure that the greatest envi-
ronmental benefit is achieved for the money
spent.
5. Monitoring of water quality should be vastly
increased. A common comment regarding
pilot trading programs is that monitoring in
those watersheds should be increased so that
environmental performance can be assessed.
There is sound logic in increased monitoring
to ascertain the results of trading pilots. How-
ever, this logic should not be restricted just to
innovative programs, but should extend to all
water quality programs. The scant evidence
available suggests that the nation’s water
quality policies are not sufficient to make
progress toward the goals of the Clean Water
Act. Given the tens of billions of dollars that
are spent on infrastructure and the hundreds
of millions on conservation subsidies, it is
penny-wise and pound-foolish to provide
insufficient funding for water quality moni-
toring. With the current levels of funding for
monitoring, we will never be able to ade-
quately assess the effectiveness of these
investments and make appropriate adjust-
ments with confidence. There is a great deal
of interest in water quality among the general
public. Some states and localities have used
this interest to develop volunteer monitoring
programs.
6. Federal and state agencies should explore
opportunities for trading in large water-
sheds. To date, trading has generally been
considered in the context of relatively small
watersheds entirely within state boundaries,
such as the ones we examined in this study.
However, there are several situations in the
United States where trading could provide
major cost savings in large basins. Two that
merit such attention are the Chesapeake Bay
and the Mississippi Basin. Drainage from
the Mississippi is the cause of one of the
nation’s biggest water quality problems, the
“dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico caused by
oxygen depletion from nutrient enrichment.
Trading programs in large basins would pre-
sent additional problems, mainly because
trades would cross state boundaries and
have to be managed at the federal rather
than the state level. The allocation of loads
and assignment of caps—something neces-
sary to set up a trading program—would
have to include major and minor watersheds
and resemble a large TMDL process. The
advantage however, would be that for the
first time policy would be forced to account
for large-scale performance objectives in a
consistent manner that was ecologically rele-
vant. The contributions of various programs
to the final objective would have to be
assessed as part of a larger framework
instead of piecemeal, as is done now. This
could do more to force improvements in
water quality than conventional approaches
now being considered.
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CONCLUSION
The Clean Water Act has succeeded in control-
ling some sources of pollution, but with counter-
vailing increases from other sources the result
has been something akin to running in place. In
many instances the nation has still not achieved
the law’s goals, and the job of cleaning up our
waterways remains unfinished. One reason we
have not moved to correct our water quality prob-
lems is that the conventional remedies are per-
ceived as too expensive. Less expensive options
involving other dischargers can produce signifi-
cant improvements in water quality at low cost.
Trading can provide a flexible alternative and
encourage the use of least-cost options.
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N O T E S
1. The states and other jurisdictions do not
use identical survey methods and criteria to
rate their water quality. Furthermore, they
may survey different waterbodies every two
years.  As a result, EPA cautions against
comparing water quality information sub-
mitted during different time periods.
Though EPA has discouraged aggregating
surveys because of methodological differ-
ences, this is currently the only trend data
available.
2. Data for 1970 to 1993 are from livestock
and poultry inventories in the USDA Eco-
nomics and Statistics System:
Cattle—(http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/
data-sets/livestock/95131/ct7084.exe, and
/ct8595.exe)
Chickens—Layers  (http://usda.mannlib.
cornell.edu/data-sets/livestock/89007/2/
table006.wk1)
Chickens–Broilers—(http://usda.mannlib.
cornell.edu/data-sets/livestock/89007/3/
table065.wk1)
Hogs—(http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/
data-sets/livestock/95131/hg4q6778.exe,
/hg4q7987.exe, and hg4q8894.exe)
Turkeys—(http://usda.mannlib.cornell.
edu/data-sets/livestock/89007/5/table131.
wk1).
Data for 1994 to 1997 are from United
States Department of Agriculture-National
Agricultural Statistics Service, Agricultural
Statistics 1998. Washington, DC: United
States Government Printing Office, 1998.
(http://www. usda.gov/nass/pubs/agr98/
acro98.htm). 
3. Manure production and nutrient content
parameters for this analysis came from
Lander et al., (1998) and USDA, 1998b.
4. An animal unit is defined as a cow with
calf, or the equivalent of 1,000 pounds of
liveweight.
5. There is a significant body of literature on
emissions trading in general and nutrient
trading in particular that largely describes
the same small set of examples. For papers
on emissions trading, see Hahn, 1988. For
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